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        Some Consequences of the Early Twentieth Century Divorce of Ownership from 
Control 
 
„..Margaret, now of age, was taking her money out of the old safe investments and putting it 
into Foreign Things, which always smash... Her own fortune was in Home Rails and most 
ardently did she beg her niece to imitate her...Margaret, out of politeness, invested a few 
hundreds in the Nottingham and Derby Railway, and though the Foreign Things did 
admirably and the Nottingham and Derby declined with the steady dignity of which only 
Home Rails were capable, Mrs Munt never ceased to rejoice...‟   
Howards End  E M Forster 
                  The fictional Mrs Munt and Margaret Schlegel were representative of the large 
number of relatively small scale and fairly passive shareholders of late Victorian and 
Edwardian Britain. Such people were part cause and part consequence of the number and 
value of firms quoted on the London stock exchange (LSE) exceeding those of the US, 
France or Germany on their national exchanges in 19002. There were more shareholders in 
the British companies than in those of similar size abroad, and the normal bargain size of the 
LSE, £100 ($500), was a fraction of that on the New York stock exchange ($10,000). 
Moreover UK equity markets were larger relative to GDP in 1913 than in 1980 3. Such facts 
suggest both that company ownership was more separated from control in Britain than 
elsewhere in the first decade of the twentieth century4 and that these arrangements must have 
had a significant impact. 
Opinion is divided about the possible consequences of this precocity for business 
performance. On the one hand, agency theorists5 maintain that splitting management control 
from ownership will misdirect managerial effort. On the other, for Britain the separation has 
been represented as unleashing the management potential of a gene pool wider than that of 
successful firm founders and their descendants 6 . From market competition could emerge 
optimum forms of corporate governance for „divorced‟ management and adverse effects 
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would be avoided7. On this view investors and managers make rational trade-offs among the 
advantages and disadvantages of different governance regimes, reaching the most effective 
compromise.  
Nonetheless faith in the equilibrating properties of markets is not sufficiently widespread to 
prevent controlling owners – when their control is inherited - being perceived as damagingly 
nepotistic, unwilling or unable to invest in scale, or otherwise inefficient8. Competition may 
be too weak to eliminate such behaviour. The quality of regulation and the legal framework 
as well plays a vital role in determining the performance of the corporate economy. The 
present paper addresses how well the 1911 actual arrangements worked.   
Because of liquidity advantages stock market finance was cheaper than that available to 
unlisted firms 9  and the high proportion of companies quoted on UK stock markets will 
therefore have helped British business. Yet there is a vast literature on the alleged 
shortcomings of late Victorian and Edwardian British business 10,  which might imply such 
advantages did not materialise, perhaps because of regulatory failure.  To date there is little 
direct evidence connecting the British legal and regulatory regime before the First World War 
with business performance.  Here we aim to fill this gap by linking aspects of corporate 
governance in Britain before the First World War with the performance of the largest 
publicly-quoted firms.    
More detailed regulation is not necessarily better than less and actual business practice may 
be better or worse than prescribed by law. In an apparently unregulated market Campbell et 
al11 point out that regular payment of adequate dividends in an earlier period was sufficient to 
satisfy investors. Focussing on practice, the strategy of the present paper is to distinguish 
structural features of corporate governance – corporate type and voting rules – that were 
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likely fixed at IPO, from more changeable variables with a potential impact on corporate 
performance: shareholding concentration, numbers of directors and directors‟ voting control/ 
shareholdings. Where there are only a few shareholders in a company the likelihood that they 
will be able to control aberrant behaviour by boards of directors or management is sometimes 
reckoned to be higher. The effectiveness of board appointments may be tested by whether 
more directors raise company performance or merely absorb company resources. The 
incentives for directors to interest themselves in companies might be measured by their 
shareholdings and their voting control conferred by these holdings.  
The principal methodological issue in the exercise is whether any co-variation of these 
indicators with performance is to be expected if the institutions are working well, and 
whether any observed co-variation reflects a causal influence in a particular direction. A 
finding that more shareholders are associated with better financial outcomes might reflect 
shareholders‟ ability to identify a good investment, or the beneficial impact of a readier 
supply of equity capital, or both. Possibly even the first effect might be combined with, but 
dominate, an adverse impact of a larger shareholder body on company performance. The 
absence of any apparent consequence could be interpreted as reflecting company optimised 
equilibria; each company chooses corporate governance and associated variables, such as 
voting rules, so as to maximise performance12. Variations in performance between companies 
then reflect their fundamental potential, not differences in corporate governance.  
A two stage approach is adopted to distinguish between these interpretations. First we find 
explanations for the corporate governance variables in terms of institutional or other 
arrangements that we can plausibly regard as fixed for the purposes of analysing behaviour in 
1911.  Some of these explanatory variables are then used as instruments for governance 
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variables in corporate performance regressions. When they ensure that the assumptions 
underlying the estimation of the regression parameters are satisfied, we can accept these 
parameters as estimates of corporate governance impact upon performance. If we find no 
apparent effect we would still need to ascertain whether each firm has simply optimised in 
their unique different circumstances. One way of doing that is to distinguish behaviour under 
different effective regulatory regimes, allowing the identification of companies‟ common and 
different circumstances.  
Section 1 outlines the principles of corporate governance, some of the evidence for its recent 
effectiveness and the historical background. Section 2 summarises our data and sections 3 
and 4 develop the models. The conclusions and implications are summarised in section 5.  
1. Corporate Governance: theory and evidence 
 Corporate governance mattered because it affected the supply and management of the British 
capital stock. If the governance framework and its operation in 1911 were poor then this may 
explain any underperformance of the British economy. At first sight corporate governance is 
a distributional matter but it is also one that, by affecting incentives, influences the efficiency 
of resource use.  Conversely if regulation seems to have been effective or unnecessary we 
have reason to suppose performance of the economy was likely to have been good relative to 
potential. Since  about a quarter of the UK‟s capital stock was controlled by large quoted 
companies, the impact of good or bad corporate governance on national assets would have 
been substantial. 
Good corporate governance 13should protect shareholders‟ interests.  A public company is 
owned by shareholders who have control rights through their votes. The separation of 
ownership and control means that they delegate control to boards of directors who pass on 
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much of it to management. Governance structures are required to resolve disagreements that 
were not anticipated when the terms and conditions of a company‟s charter (or statutory 
clauses or memorandum and articles of association) were agreed. The cost of considering all 
eventualities, and negotiating and specifying enforceable agreements, ensure that parties 
cannot and will not write comprehensive founding contracts. Governance structure therefore 
allocates residual rights of control over the firm's non-human assets14.  Such structures are 
invoked if there are agency problems that cannot be dealt with by contract. In short, corporate 
governance matters when contracts are incomplete and there are difficulties arising from 
delegation within the firm.  
That shareholders‟ interests needed protection had been frequently demonstrated . Statutory 
companies often had explicit reporting and voting rules and other obligations that were 
consolidated in the 1845 Companies Clauses Consolidation Acts15. With the Royal British 
Bank scandal of 1856 the state was obliged to attempt the reconciliation of the competing 
claims of shareholders and depositors and to legislate to prevent future frauds. Radical 
reforms were rejected in favour of measures designed to encourage shareholders to fulfil their 
regulatory duties 16 . The original intention behind the 1856 Act had been to increase the 
disclosure obligations of joint stock companies, but Parliament actually reduced requirements 
to very little. The 1855 and 1856 Companies Acts were followed by many dramatic failures 
where shareholders' money was negligently or fraudulently lost. These company collapses 
under the newly liberalised regulation were centred in finance, insurance and banking  
because coal, iron and engineering, which needed physical industry-specific assets to be 
credible, were much more likely to be genuine enterprises17. The upside of liberalisation, 
however, is perhaps that the new permissive legislation boosted investment even though it 
lowered efficiency18.   
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Continuing attempts to control moral hazard in corporate governance included the Act of 
1890 that laid down that company officials guilty of misconduct, misinformation or trading 
while insolvent, could be required to pay full compensation to those affected. Yet the 
Comptroller-General for bankruptcies for 1895 lamented that this provision was not in 
general implemented  He complained that many liquidations still occurred solely because 
joint stock companies provided the opportunity to defraud creditors 19. The Companies Act 
1900 strengthened the principle of compulsory corporate disclosure, for example by 
extending the requirement to publish balance sheets from statutory to registered companies. 
Consistent with either improving UK corporate governance or increasing moral pressure is 
the decline between 1892 and 1913 in losses from corporate winding up in the UK20 .  
Railways constituted a special corporate category for which user groups were especially 
powerful, triggering increasingly restrictive regulation, such as the 1894 Railway and Canal 
Traffic Act that shifted the burden of proof of discrimination in a rate change from the 
objector to the railways. Since the offence was not clearly defined, railways became 
committed to holding down rates under any circumstances 21 . The absence of either 
competitive pressures, well-designed regulatory pressures or the takeover bidding that drove 
contemporary American railway reorganisations plausibly had distinctively negative effects 
on profitability and efficiency in the UK 22.  
Then and now, widely dispersed shareholders have minimal incentives to monitor 
management, for monitoring is a public good: if one shareholder's scrutiny leads to improved 
company performance, all shareholders benefit. Given that monitoring is costly, each 
shareholder may free-ride in the hope that others will do the scrutinising. If all shareholders 
think the same way the result is that little checking will be undertaken. This could give rise to 
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an agency problem: managers of a public company may pursue their own goals at the 
expense of the shareholders. They may overpay themselves and give themselves extravagant 
perks, or carry out unprofitable but power-enhancing investments, or even run down the 
capital of the company.  
On the other hand, concentration of shareholders can have either harmful or beneficial effects 
for minority owners. Large shareholders, better able to monitor management, might have 
little incentive to exploit minority shareholders because the extra cash-flow would be small. 
Yet these large shareholders might extract other private benefits from control due to their 
greater influence on the company.  
Other constraints on corporate management include monitoring by boards of directors; non-
executive directors might monitor executive directors and independent chairs might do the 
same, along with audit and remuneration committees. The number of directors necessary or 
ideal for scrutinising and advising management has been debated for many years. But 
otherwise these issues (non-executive monitoring of executives apart) were not much 
discussed during the period of the present study, though there was a 1900 requirement that 
auditors could not be directors.   
The importance of appropriate incentives for directors was also recognised in the 
longstanding requirement of the LSE that directors be shareholders, though companies were 
free to set the level as low as £1, so effectively it remained optional. But co mpanies in our 
population chose to require amounts up to £25,000, with an average of £2240 (and in almost 
all firms directors actually held more), so directors‟ incentives were to some extent aligned 
with shareholder interests. As one Edwardian investment adviser delicately put the problem 
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of directorial shirking “If it is found that the directors are but small shareholders, there is the 
risk that the management may not display active intelligence”23.   
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of managing firms without ownership is mixed even 
for the US in recent times. One survey24 found that boards of directors could become too big; 
agency problems (such as director free-riding) increased with board size.  Later US research25 
cast doubt on this hypothesis but  a study of 450 firms in 10 OECD countries did find a 
negative relation between board size and corporate performance, controlling for 
endogeneity26.   Recognising this potential endogeneity of directors, Adams et al.27 emphasise 
that many studies of boards should be interpreted as jointly assessing the director-selection 
process and the effect of board composition on board actions and firm performance.  
A special case of the endogeneity problem is that of optimal equilibrium. Demsetz and 
Villalonga28 claim for the US that firms adopt the corporate governance arrangements – such 
as numbers of board directors, proportion of management share ownership, or voting rules - 
most appropriate to their circumstances. Therefore no association across heterogeneous firms 
should be expected or observed between these arrangements and corporate performance. 
They model ownership structure - management share ownership and shareholding 
concentration - as endogenous variables. They find ownership structure depends upon firm 
performance but there is no reverse causation; with appropriate controls variations in firm 
performance do not appear to depend upon ownership structure. Although this is consistent 
with ownership structure being an optimal response to circumstances as they claim, it is also 
consistent with ownership structure being ineffective.  
Corporate governance structures may need to be adapted to individual corporate 
circumstances but they might not necessarily always be ideal; the 'institutional market' may 
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not be in long run competitive equilibrium all the time. Recognition of the potential 
endogeneity of directors is not the same as assuming there will always be the right number. 
Directors will add value if the system works well but there is no reason to suppose that the 
supply of suitable directors will always match the demand, and that the number will always 
be optimal. 
In Edwardian Britain, most executive directors were promoted from within companies and 
most non-executives were recruited from professional, social and regional networks. Both 
were perhaps sometimes constrained by the requirements for a minimum director‟s 
shareholding (which, in marked contrast to modern share incentive schemes, at the upper end 
required an investment of several years‟ salary by senior managers promoted to the board). 
Moreover, at a time when their reputation was high, extensive overseas recruitment of mobile 
British managers limited the domestic supply29. In addition, although business was a more 
effective channel for mobility into the elite for children of manual workers than were the 
professions, lack of access to education and to capital prevented the bulk of the population 
from entering the upper echelons of business30. The likelihood that every company could 
always optimally adjust the supply of directors to demand is therefore remote, creating the 
possibility that the demand for directors can be identified.  
As far as the effects of shareholder dispersal or concentration are concerned, these may well 
depend on national institutions. Evidence for Germany is that for most types of large 
shareholder, the benefits for minority shareholders of increased big shareholder ownership 
were at least as great as the harm, and sometimes significantly greater 31 . It has been 
contended that corporate governance differences between US and the UK ensure external 
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shareholders -particularly institutions - are better able to constrain managerial discretion in 
the UK32.   
 As long as  the concentration or dispersal of shareholdings are dominated by firm-specific 
circumstances that are not necessarily desired by the firm, the impact of numbers of 
shareholders on corporate performance, rather than the causes of the latter, may be observed.  
Companies that discovered how to tap mass markets for shares would have had a lower cost 
of capital and more shareholders, with consequences for corporate performance. Directors‟ 
shareholdings again may have been independent of the optimal incentive structure for the 
company but instead varied with personal circumstances and preferences. If so, incentive 
effects of shareholdings on company performance may be observable.  
Board voting rules and corporate type (chartered, statutory or registered), might be rather 
different. Perhaps there is more reason to suppose those launching the enterprise provided 
optimal arrangements, so long as relevant corporate circumstances did not change between 
33the formation date and the period of concern. In this case there may be no relation between 
voting rules and corporate type on the one hand and performance on the other.   
That good corporate regulation is essential to addressing the agency problem has been 
emphasised by La Porta et al 34 who maintain that concentrated ownership is a response to 
regulatory shortcomings. But better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the 
conflict of interest between large and small shareholders and therefore pull in the opposite 
direction. Legal protection affects the opportunities for directors to expropriate shareholders 
but also the incentives for large shareholders to monitor management.  
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2. The 1911 data 
To assess these views we employ a data set drawn from the 339 large 35 (issued share capital 
of £1 million or more), independent, British-owned companies with shares listed on a UK 
stock exchange. These data are largely taken from the 1912 edition of the Investors Year 
Book and so reflect the late 1911 position, as described in Foreman-Peck and Hannah36 . 
However, as pointed out in the previous section, British railways were uniquely regulated in 
this period and largely unconstrained by competition, with the consequence that performance 
was poor37. We therefore exclude British rails from the data set, though we retain British-
owned and -managed railways operating in freer overseas markets. 38  We also exclude 16 
companies for which there is no independent evidence of directors‟ holdings and shareholder 
numbers. Additionally in some equations we exclude 9 companies with shareholder numbers 
but for which directors‟ holdings are unknown, and 8 for which directors‟ shareholdings are 
known but shareholder numbers are not.  
Testing the effectiveness of corporate governance requires an assessment of the remaining 
agency problems and the impact of different corporate arrangements on performance indices. 
The first index we choose is the company‟s share premium above par in 1911 39 . The 
assumption is that the share price reflects the capitalised value of expected profits and that the 
par value approximates a company‟s assets at IPO, plus new issues since IPO. The greater the 
share price premium above par, the stronger the reputation and anticipated performance of the 
firm. We also assume that, in a cross-section of firms, market expectations are the best 
relative forecast of profitability, given the available information.  
Par is not the same as issue price. At IPO the company would have been formed before the 
price was set. In response to changed market conditions, it was often a little above or below, 
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although basically the same, for all capital issued. Of an 800+ pre-1914 IPO sample, 9 out of 
10 were issued at par 40 . The maintained hypothesis is that par value roughly reflected 
underlying asset values (at replacement cost). In short the contention is that the 1911 share 
premium is an acceptable proxy for the increase in the present value of expected profits since 
IPO. If the wrong corporate governance structure were adopted, or the firm were unlucky or 
badly managed, then shares would drop below issue price. With a good governance structure 
they would appreciate, for a good governance structure would be able to take account of 
changes in the market since IPO or reconstruction.  
We also use the return on paid up capital (RoE) as a second performance indicator. This is a 
more limited measure because it is concerned only with one period and investors might be 
inclined to discount one period shocks and take a longer view. They may through personal 
contacts and other informal channels of information have acquired different, and perhaps 
better informed, opinions about corporate earnings prospects than could be gleaned from 
annual accounts. Nonetheless one period returns are not dependent on assuming that investors 
have rational expectations, as is the share premium index, and so are of some interest. In 
addition they provide a performance indicator for companies, such as Imperial Tobacco, 
whose ordinary shares were entirely privately held, preventing our calculating a share 
premium. 
Corporate samples tend to be right skewed and the present dataset is no exception (Table 1). 
The share premium shows that the mean firm‟s ordinary shares had appreciated by 117 
percent above par, although this average was pulled up by a few high flyers. The median 
company achieved only a 43 percent appreciation. Similarly the mean return on paid up share 
capital at 17 percent was double the median of 8 percent. „Personally managed‟ 41 J&P Coats 
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with a 30 percent return on equity, and a 1000 per cent premium at first sight was a star 
performer. Mather & Platt, classified by Chandler42  as an entrepreneurial failure („minor 
producer of specialised electrical equipment‟) achieved a 14.2 percent return and almost a 
100 percent appreciation. However, the best returns were found in the financial sector; for 
instance Scottish Union and National Insurance achieved 252 percent profit on paid up 
capital and a broadly similar premium43.  
While one company (Bleachers, the textile finishers) was governed by 37 directors, the 
median board size of 8 was not much different from the mean of 9.5. There appears little 
chance of directors influencing average corporate behaviour on the basis of their 
shareholdings alone, for the percentage of a company‟s shares held by directors was generally 
small, with a median of 2.9 percent and a mean of 7.8 percent. These numbers are not much 
raised when board control of votes is considered; the mean rises to 12 percent and the median 
to 3.4 percent. Numbers of shareholders ranged from 170 to 41,000 with a median of 2,800 
and a mean of 4,898 (Table 1). 
  Greater risk lowers the value of expected profits for risk-averse investors. We measure risk, 
the volatility of share prices, by the dispersion of share price-difference between highest and 
lowest share price for the year, normalized by the average of the two 44  („Vol‟ and „Vol sq‟d‟, 
when the square of volatility is included). Location and sector dummies are also allowed to 
influence performance. The inauguration year („Date‟) and size measured by paid up capital 
(„Lsize1‟) complete the list of possible controls. It should be noted that the binding 
constraints on the number of usable observations are the two dependent variables 45.  
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
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Turning to the structural corporate governance feature, statutory companies (those set up by 
private act of parliament or provisional order, and usually subject to the provisions of the 
1845 and subsequent Companies Clauses Consolidation Acts, CCCA) had the strongest 
regulation and are the second largest category.  A hypothesis is that both statutory and 
chartered companies had more rigorous rules broadly as in the CCCA, and so were better 
governed than registered companies which did not have similar parliamentary scrutiny. 
Registered companies (that is generic companies simply registered since the procedure was 
first authorized in 1844 and at this date subject to the 1908 Companies (Consolidation) Act) 
were the largest category but more lightly regulated. The null hypothesis then is that there is 
no difference between the two categories because big registered companies usually adopted 
CCCA-style governance rules voluntarily.  The statutory and chartered sectors were mainly 
in finance and utilities, though constituted only a minority of each sector (Table 2). 46 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
Voting rules adopted by joint stock companies could be a significant element of corporate 
governance. For present purposes these rules have been aggregated into the two principal 
categories of Table 2, „takeover constrained‟ or not. This first category consists of „capped‟ 
and „tiered‟ rules.   Capped voting was achieved either by limiting the maximum permitted 
individual shareholding or by disqualifying shares above a specified holding from the vote. 
This rule was quite common in the finance sector, which included three quarters of the cases. 
Financiers traditionally took the view (often shared by regulators) that there may be particular 
dangers for this sector in being over- influenced or even owned by customers, particularly 
those who might aspire to favours. Tiered voting rules (the more shares held the less the 
incremental votes) had the same effect as capped, so they are grouped together in Table 2.  
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Regressions of regulated status, and of voting rule, together with finance and utilities 
dummies on the log of mean returns on equity in 1911 and log of the share premium did not 
yield statistically significant coefficients on regulated or voting status (not tabulated here). 
These results are consistent with the spread of good practice among all the large listed firms 
whatever their corporate type. Equally they are consistent with lax regulation, independent of 
corporate type, if regulated firms were not constrained in any way. However, there is some 
evidence below in favour of the first interpretation.  
  Chandler‟s47 famously negative view of British corporate governance alleged that „outside 
directors were selected as much for family connections and social position as for industrial 
experience.‟ Of course such a preference for aristocratic directors could have been rational if 
they drew in more shareholders. Though Table 3 shows manufacturing – on which Chandler 
focuses especially - was most prone to family directorships, families were not especially 
prominent even there, as measured by the numbers of directors with duplicated family 
names48. Aristocrats did not especially favour manufacturing, perhaps because bigger fees 
were to be obtained on finance boards.  
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
The mean number of titled directors per company was 1.55, with a maximum of 17 49 and 
most companies having no titled director.  Mean directors per company with a duplicated 
family name was 0.7 with a maximum of 12.50 Again, companies with such directors were the 
exception rather than the rule.  
The proportion of „aristocratic‟ directors varied by industry inversely with the proportion of 
family directors; foreign railways followed by finance were destinations for aristocrats, with 
one fifth of the average board, whereas there were no family directors in foreign rails and 
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they were rare in quoted financial companies. On the other hand in brewing family directors 
accounted for one quarter of the average board but (despite the contemporary lampooning of 
the elevation of many of them to the “beerage”) aristocrats constituted only 7 percent.  
3. Determinants of Corporate Governance  
The above structural and social features of corporate governance – corporate type and voting 
rules– that were probably fixed at IPO, plus directors‟ characteristics , are here distinguished 
from more changeable variables with a potential impact on corporate performance;  
shareholding concentration, numbers of directors and directors voting control/ shareholdings.  
In addition we also assume that whether a company is quoted in London („Lon‟) and whether 
the principal field of operation is the UK („Britain‟), are exogenous to the models.  As 
outlined in the introduction, one of the motivations is to identify the impact of corporate 
governance on corporate performance. Identification and estimation of coefficients in the 
equations below requires the random, firm-specific, disturbance terms, ei, are independent of 
the right hand side variables. So tests must be conducted for whether this is the case.  
Corporate governance=f („structural‟ corporate governance, company characteristics,  e1) 
  ..(1) 
Corporate performance =g (corporate governance, company characteristics, e2)   
  ..(2) 
Demsetz and Villalonga51 maintain the true coefficients on corporate governance in (2) are 
zero but because e1 and e2 are correlated single equation estimates of (2) yield non-zero 
coefficients. A unique feature of a company (a high value of e1 say) warrants a high value of 
the corporate governance variable. Suppose this unique feature of the company happened also 
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to be associated with unusually good corporate performance (a high value of e2).  The 
corporate governance variable and the disturbance term e2 are positively correlated in this 
example. So in this case a high value of the corporate governance variable will be associated 
with a strong corporate performance even though there is no direct causal connection.  We 
test whether this affects our estimates by ensuring that corporate governance variables in (2) 
are uncorrelated with e2, using instrumental variables and associated exogeneity tests
52. 
Estimates of equation 1 are presented in Table 4. Equation 4.i explains the governance 
characteristic of number of directors on a company board. Larger companies (log of paid up 
capital, „lsize1‟) had more directors. Regulated companies („Regco‟) appear to have 
significantly more directors than other corporate types (Table 4 (i)). By contrast  neither the 
proportion of „titled‟ directors („Proparisto‟) nor the proportion of directors („Propdir‟) with 
family connections is significantly associated with larger boards. Firms whose principal area 
of activity was the United Kingdom („Britain‟) tended to have more directors, possibly 
because the supply of those suitably qualified was less constrained. Voting rules to prevent 
takeover were not associated significantly with board size, but companies in the finance 
sector had more directors (the base case is „other industry‟) and to a lesser extent so did those 
in manufacturing. Brewing, a traditional family dominated sector, on the other hand, had 
fewer directors. Partly paid capital companies were prone to have more directors, perhaps 
because shareholders with such liabilities particularly valued stronger monitoring.  
Bigger companies not surprisingly had more shareholders and apparently a larger number of 
„titled‟ directors („Aristocratic‟) attracted a greater number of shareholders (Table 4 (iii)) 
(although a larger proportion of titles („Proparisto‟) did not). Being quoted in London („Lon‟) 
and operating primarily in the United Kingdom („Britain‟) had qualitatively similar effects. 
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But the capped plus tiered voting rule („Takevote‟)  and regulated companies („Regco‟) did 
not influence shareholder numbers (we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero 
coefficient), according to these equations.  
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
Companies with more family directors tended to have significantly higher proportions of 
shares owned by the board („Board share‟) and equally plausibly in larger companies the 
board controlled smaller proportions of the total share capital (Table 4 iv - vii). Again the 
regulated status of the company and takeover voting rules apparently exercised no influence. 
Similar results are found for voting control („Lboardvotin‟ eqn vii), including that those more 
recently inaugurated also tended to have higher board votes.  
4. Determinants of corporate performance 
The above contributors to corporate governance are predicted to affect corporate performance 
(equation 2 above). We might expect from the earlier discussion that greater shareholding 
dispersion („Lnoofsh‟ larger for given firm size) would lower performance if corporate 
governance was weak; large shareholders would be necessary to keep management up to the 
mark. Again if corporate governance was weak, directors might be inclined to pack the 
boards with their friends and relatives who did not add value to the company; firms with 
more directors („Noofdirect‟ larger) would then perform no better than those with less. Then 
there is board directors‟ control of the company through the voting powers („Lboardvotin‟) 
conferred in part by their shareholdings („Board Share‟) which gives them a material 
incentive to ensure profits and dividends.53 Poor corporate governance might allow directors 
with greater voting control more easily to exploit their company‟s assets in ways beneficial to 
themselves but that did not boost share price or profits.  
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  If more directors were preferable to less, those firms with more would be outperforming 
those with less and sending a market signal that more directors were desirable. Why did not 
such companies appoint more directors and raise their returns? S upply rather than demand 
side considerations may be binding; more directors may be wanted but none suitable may be 
available. In which case, observations will identify the demand for directors. Share ownership 
may not be sufficiently concentrated to incentivize successful monitoring o f management 
because some shareholders refuse to sell to others. Or directors might want to reach a mass 
market for their shares so as to reduce their price of capital, but their corporate reputation or 
marketing may not permit the popularity to which they aspire, so average size of 
shareholding remains high and numbers of shareholders relatively small. Or board voting 
allocations may stem from historical accident and control. In short if these types of 
constrained equilibria were likely, then a test of the effectiveness of corporate governance is 
the sign and significance of the influence of these three variables on the corporate 
performance indicators – contrary to the Demsetz and Villalonga critique.   
 To estimate these coefficients accurately other influences on corporate performance must be 
controlled. These may include risk (measured by share volatility, „vol‟, „vol squared‟), and 
the size of the company (as well as the sector in which it operated).  To test whether 
corporate governance arrangements influenced performance when other contributors are 
controlled, we estimate by various regression methods on both indicators, broadly the 
following model for the ith firm; 
Corporate performancei = f(„Noodirectorsi‟, „Lnoofshi‟, Llboardvotini‟, „Board Sharei‟,  Riski, Sizei, 
Ui )   ….(2a) 
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The first four variables measure the impact of corporate governance. Predictions of the signs 
of the corporate governance measures considered here are generally ambiguous, though the 
signs for testing for poor corporate governance are not. Do directors‟ shareholdings („Board 
Share‟) allow directors to exercise control over the company in their own interests (-) or do 
they more closely align directors‟ interests with those of shareholders (+)?  Closely related 
must be board share of votes („Lboardvotin‟) for this is one consequence of directors‟ share 
ownership.  
 Directorial control might decline with a smaller number of shareholders („Lnoofsh‟), for 
widely dispersed shareholdings are harder to coordinate by those who wish to challenge the 
board. If directors‟ control was exercised against shareholder interest, for given directors‟ 
shareholding the share premium should fall with number of shareholders or rise with average 
shareholding size.  
 How many directors are necessary for the supervision and strategic management of a 
company? Number of directors („Noofdirect‟), as indicated above, might show an inverted U 
shaped relation to corporate performance („Noofdirect‟>0,„Dir sq‟d‟<0); it must be possible 
to have too many of them, or too few.  
We estimate corporate performance equations separately on the assumption that each of the 
four governance variables of concern is endogenous and then compare each to the equivalent 
equation assuming all governance variables are exogenous. First we consider the premium 
performance indicator. Table 4 suggests some possible instrumental variables for the 
corporate governance variables. Including the regulated company variable („Regco‟) as an 
instrument in performance equations is acceptable because there was no measurable direct 
effect on performance (nor was there for „Takevote,‟ not tabulated here). There was no 
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difference in the performance between regulated and unregulated companies presumably 
because where appropriate big registered companies usually adopted CCCA-style governance 
rules voluntarily – assuming these rules were effective, as the consequences for directors 
numbers reported in Table 4 might imply.  
Equation i Table 5 is estimated by GMM instrumental variables 54 , assuming number of 
directors is endogenous and identifying by means of the excluded instruments suggested by 
4.i.  Performance appears to decline with rises in company size and in share price volatility 
(quadratically, „vol‟, „vol sq‟d‟) but increases with number of shareholders and number of 
directors.  The equation passes the K-P LM under- identification test (instruments correlated 
with the regressor). The Hansen J statistic indicates the instruments are valid; uncorrelated 
with the disturbance term and correctly excluded. The endogeneity test indicates the null of 
exogeneity cannot be rejected.  
Estimating the same specification by the more efficient OLS reduces the coefficient on 
directors‟ numbers but otherwise changes the coefficients little. Adding a squared number of 
directors variable („Directors sq‟d‟, Eq.iii) implies that to maximize the share premium, the 
optimum number of directors is (.156/(2*.00368)=) 21. The implication is that the twenty-
second director was redundant or even a handicap (the Bleachers Association, with 37, was 
very much overstaffed). This seems to have been generally appreciated at the time 55. Since 
the great majority of companies had fewer than 22 directors it is fair to say directors did add 
value on average. These results are not changed when the (a ll statistically insignificant) sector 
dummies and the year of inauguration are included in the model.  
Turning to the (log of the ) number of shareholders IV equation (5.iv) this has a highly 
significant KP LM statistic, indicating model identification (excluded instruments are 
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relevant, that is correlated with the endogenous regressors) and  the Hanson J statistic does 
not reject the null of uncorrelated with disturbance term. The shareholders‟ coefficient is 
significant at the 5 percent level and double the OLS estimate. The endogeneity test indicates 
the null of exogeneity cannot be rejected.  We conclude that more shareholders do boost the 
share premium, presumably because they lower the firm‟s cost of capital, more than entirely 
offsetting any undesirable loss of monitoring incentives. Agency problems are not implied by 
the effects of share dispersion, for the premium falls with the (log of)  the number of 
shareholders („Lnoofsh‟), holding constant company size (as measured by the log of share 
capital , „Lsize1‟). Greater shareholder concentration - as against directors‟ control - brings a 
lower premium, once more inconsistent with poor corporate governance.  56 
The effect of board voting control is not significantly different from zero in the GMM 
equation and in the OLS version (in combination with board shareholding as shown in 6.vi or 
separately – not reported here). So we cannot reject the hypothesis that greater board voting 
control has neither favourable nor unfavourable effects on the premium. A higher  board share 
of capital, generally associated with greater board control, but perhaps incentivizing the 
Board to greater efforts, similarly is not significantly different from zero.  
<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
Neither titled directors nor family directors exercised a significant negative or positive effect 
on the premium independently of the number of directors (not tabulated here). This means 
that the hypothesis that such directors were included on the board on their merits cannot be 
rejected57. 
Turning now to the alternative performance indicator, the ratio of profit to paid up share 
capital in 1911, the ordinary least squares model shows returns increased with (log of) 
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shareholder numbers („Lnoofsh‟), contrary to the poor corporate governance prediction. Also 
a negative relation to company size (measured by paid up capital) is estimated but otherwise 
the coefficients are not significantly different from zero (Table 6.i). However, this general 
result is overturned when the corporate governance variables are estima ted on the assumption 
they are endogenous58. Number of directors becomes a highly significant and large positive 
influence on return on equity in equation iii and in equation iv board voting control 
negatively and significantly affects profitability (implying possible “tunnelling” by insider 
directors) while the closely related directors‟ shareholding has the opposite impact 
(suggesting a positive effect of ownership incentives that do not offer disproportionate 
control rights). The latter behaviour seem to dominate: the net effect of an increase of one 
standard deviation of board voting control and an increase of one standard deviation of board 
proportion of share ownership is to raise the log of RoE. 59  
It should be remembered that the RoE horizon is shorter than the forward looking equation, 
which may explain the contrasting endogeneity of the governance variables. While 
management may not have been invariably as efficient as it could have been, the corporate 
governance regime did seem to push them in the right direction, according to both 
performance indicators. Overall the RoE results are the opposite of Demsetz and Villalonga; 
the structural coefficients are significantly positive while the single equation coefficients tend 
not to be. 
<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
5. Conclusion. 
However permissive corporate governance of larger UK joint stock companies was in 1911, it 
was effective compared to the arrangement in later times. The received wisdom of a twentieth 
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century capitalism of constantly improving corporate governance, investment bankers‟ 
diligent information signalling and better accounting rules overcoming agency problems may 
(as recent events remind us)   simply betray a misplaced belief in the inevitability of progress. 
Greater numbers of shareholders boosted the share premium and the return on assets for large 
British quoted companies in 1911. Our interpretation is that firms that could or did attract a 
wider shareholding achieved a higher return on equity by appealing to more of a mass 
investor market. This was not offset by less individual shareholder influence over 
management, as a dysfunctional view of corporate governance might suggest. Some 
companies might have wanted to attract numerous small shareholders who were willing to 
accept directors‟ guidance unquestioningly but may not have been able to draw them for lack 
of reputation or presentation of inappropriate corporate governance rules at IPO.  
               The positive impact of the number of directors on corporate performance may have 
stemmed from their information function and expertise. Or, their reputation was such that the 
market thought they had value- but then they seem to have been associated with greater 
measured profitability as well. In any case the result runs counter to the recent experience 
reported for the modern USA by Hermalin and Weisbach60, again suggesting the UK 1911 
market worked quite effectively. In the short term (the RoE indicator) it was advisable for 
directors to own a significant share capital if their interests were to be fully aligned with 
shareholders; in the long term, with shareholder forward- looking perceptions there is no 
evidence that greater board ownership and control favoured or harmed shareholders through 
the share premium.   
Doubtless many British businesses operated before 1914 below their theoretical optimum, but 
that is true of all countries at all times. Credible assessments of alleged systemic sources of 
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economic failure must apply to a significant part of the economy and the comparators, such 
as other countries, should be appropriate. Our evaluation of a range of UK business 
governance structures before 1914 passes those critical tests. Corporate governance may not 
have been ideal in the British stock markets of 1911, but many arrangements operated to the 
benefit of shareholders. A possible reason, suggested by Chambers and Dimson 61  in a 
different context, and consistent with the Kay Review on Equity Markets62, is that greater 
trust in 1911 more than offset less thorough regulation and reporting. Alternatively or 
additionally private or state regulation was more pervasive and effective than most 
researchers have assumed. 63  Either way the early twentieth century pervasive divorce of 
ownership from control in large-scale British businesses appears to have been managed well.  
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Table 1 The 1911 Large Quoted Company Dataset: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Median 
Premium plus par(100) 237 217.52 251.97 0 2350 143.5 
Return on (paid-up) equity % 233 16.70 24.67 -5.49 147.35 8.27 
Number of directors 265 9.53 5.93 3 37 8 
Number of shareholders 265 4898 6185 170 41000 2800 
Date of formation 265 1874 31.81 1694 1911 1887 
Board share of votes % 265 11.98 19.9 0 100 3.4 
Board share of capital % 265 7.80 11.68 0.04 71.2 2.9 
Paid up Capital (£m) 265 2.63 4.77 0.05 53.17 1.4 
Issued Share Capital (£m) 265 3.54 5.40 1 53.17 1.8 
Volatility (risk) 237 0.23 0.26 0 1.97 0.15 
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Table 2   Corporate Type, Voting Rules  and Sector  
 
 
Brewing Finance Manuf'ring Other Rails (for'n) Utilities Total 
Unregulated 17 81 55 40 35 26 254 
Regulated 0 20 0 3 1 18 42 
Unconstrained 15 65 45 30 34 34 223 
Takeover constrained 2 36 10 13 2 10 73 
Total 17 101 55 43 36 44 296  
Note: Total exceeds that of the main sample because only domestic rails are excluded.
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Table 3 Directors of the Large Quoted Companies. 
Sector 
Mean 
number 
duplicating 
family 
names 
Proportion 
duplicating 
family        
names 
Maximum 
Mean 
number 
with 
titles 
Proportion 
with titles 
Maximum 
Manufacturing 2.018 0.153 12 0.907 0.101 4 
Brewing 1.823 0.240 4 0.588 0.074 3 
Finance 0.303 0.027 5 2.212 0.191 17 
Utilities 0.186 0.026 1 1.349 0.155 8 
Railways 
(foreign) 
0 0 0 1.5 0.217 7 
Other 0.547 0.063 5 1.428 0.199 5 
Total 0.691 0.065 12 1.546 0.165 17 
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Table 4 Determinants of Corporate Governance Variables  
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
 
No. of 
directors 
Lnoofsh Lnoofsh 
Board 
share 
Board 
share 
Lboardvotin Lboardvotin 
        
Lsize1 2.076*** 0.805*** 0.774*** -0.00804 -0.0132*  -0.185*  -0.282**  
 
(4.11) (14.49) (13.79) (-1.30) (-2.22) (-2.00) (-3.10) 
        
Propdir 6.342*  -0.490 
 
0.339*** 
 
3.986*** 
 
 
(2.24) (-0.90) 
 
(4.16) 
 
(5.80) 
 
        
Proparisto -2.265 0.00371 
 
0.0293 
 
-0.0802 
 
 
(-1.36) (0.02) 
 
(0.81) 
 
(-0.16) 
 
        
Aristocratic 
  
0.0510* 
 
0.00364 
 
0.0558 
   
(1.98) 
 
(1.55) 
 
(1.44) 
        
Fam. Dir.  
  
0.00302 
 
0.0202** 
 
0.285*** 
   
(0.08) 
 
(2.92) 
 
(4.54) 
        
Takevote 0.557 0.142 0.137 -0.0162 -0.0161 -0.113 -0.0967 
 
(0.69) (1.38) (1.35) (-1.23) (-1.23) (-0.65) (-0.56) 
        
Regco 3.355** -0.234 -0.273 0.0274 0.0188 0.740*  0.601 
 
(2.65) (-1.27) (-1.51) (1.22) (0.85) (2.12) (1.77) 
        
London 0.515 0.296** 0.302** -0.0465** -0.0501** -0.438*  -0.479*  
 
(0.72) (2.65) (2.70) (-2.91) (-3.07) (-2.39) (-2.59) 
        
Britain  1.476*  0.432*** 0.419*** 0.00317 0.00685 0.0732 0.122 
 
(2.36) (3.83) (3.78) (0.25) (0.53) (0.39) (0.67) 
        
date -0.00948 -0.00311 -0.00262 0.000340 0.000397 0.00822**  0.00890**  
 
(-0.70) (-1.49) (-1.20) (1.68) (1.89) (2.66) (2.85) 
        
part 3.407** 0.615*** 0.572*** 0.00826 -0.00449 0.291 0.0973 
 
(3.23) (4.08) (3.89) (0.61) (-0.34) (1.34) (0.49) 
        
Manufact 2.093*  0.189 0.178 0.0289 0.0284 0.488 0.474 
 
(2.15) (0.98) (0.94) (1.21) (1.20) (1.77) (1.74) 
        
Finance 2.511** 0.0871 0.0941 -0.0346 -0.0377 -0.644*  -0.663*  
 
(2.97) (0.49) (0.53) (-1.66) (-1.89) (-2.29) (-2.48) 
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Utilit ies -0.695 0.137 0.158 -0.0499*  -0.0514*  -1.023*** -0.997*** 
 
(-0.71) (0.78) (0.93) (-2.24) (-2.37) (-3.41) (-3.37) 
        
Brewing -2.112*  -0.401 -0.445*  0.0623 0.0965* 0.143 0.555 
 
(-2.46) (-1.82) (-2.10) (1.39) (2.00) (0.27) (1.05) 
        
Rails (non 
UK) 
-1.370 -0.392*  -0.348 -0.0428 -0.0463 -1.792*** -1.769*** 
 
(-1.67) (-2.11) (-1.91) (-1.79) (-1.95) (-5.20) (-5.11) 
        
N 290 268 268 265 265 263 263 
r2_a 0.264 0.530 0.534 0.398 0.356 0.511 0.504 
Aic 1771.3 569.5 567.2 -505.1 -487.5 822.1 825.7 
Note: t statistics in parentheses= p<0.05 , ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001. Constant included but not tabulated. Robust standard 
errors.  
Variable key: Aristocratic – number of Lords plus baronets on Board of directors; Board share - Share of board of directors 
capital  in issued capital; Britain –Principal area of company activity UK; Date - year of IPO or reorganisation; Fam. Dir. – 
number of family directors on board; Lboardvotin – log of board maximum voting control;  London – quoted on the London 
stock exchange; Lsize1 – log of paid up capital (£m); Lnoofsh – log of number of shareholders; Part – company capital 
partly paid; Proparisto - proportion of members of House of Lords plus baronets in Board of directors; Propdir – proportion 
of family directors on board but see footnote 15; Regco – regulated company; that is statutory or chartered versus the rest 
(mainly „registered‟); Takevote – Ordinary share voting restricted to limit takeover possibilities. Two categories: capped and 
tiered limiting takeover possibilities, and others. 
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Table 5 Share Premia Response to Corporate Governance Variables in 1911 
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Estimation GMM IV OLS  OLS  GMM IV GMM IV OLS  
       
Noofdirectors 0.0657*** 0.0366*** 0.156*** 0.125** 0.128*** 0.157*** 
 
(3.86) (3.53) (5.36) (3.11) (4.58) (5.42) 
       
Lsize1 -0.338*** -0.404*** -0.337*** -0.515*** -0.335*** -0.306*** 
 
(-5.45) (-6.65) (-5.77) (-3.67) (-4.11) (-5.18) 
       
Vol -3.776*** -3.309*** -3.202*** -3.529*** -3.322*** -3.195*** 
 
(-6.35) (-5.15) (-5.06) (-5.79) (-5.21) (-4.84) 
       
Vol. sq'd 1.363** 1.087* 1.029* 1.258** 1.331** 1.025* 
 
(3.12) (2.33) (2.25) (3.13) (3.04) (2.16) 
       
Lnoofsh 0.258** 0.294*** 0.270*** 0.558* 0.260*** 0.257*** 
 
(3.12) (4.19) (4.18) (2.41) (3.30) (3.82) 
       
Director sq'd 
  
-0.00368*** 
-
0.00321*** 
-0.00294*** -0.00374*** 
   
(-4.37) (-3.40) (-3.80) (-4.46) 
       
Lboardvotin 
    
-0.000487 0.0240 
     
(-0.00) (0.47) 
       
Board share  
    
0.276 -0.108 
     
(0.12) (-0.14) 
Shea R2  0.155 
  
0.083 
sh 0.089  
lb 0.111  
KP  LM under-
ident. 
22.923 
(0.0003)   
18.748 
(0.0021) 
10.64 (0.059) 
 
H-Jstat 6.912 (0.141) 
  
5.559 
(0.235) 
8.26 (0.082) 
 
Endog. test 1.948 (0.163) 
  
1.806 
(0.179) 
0.03 (0.985) 
 
Excluded instr. : regco date f m br 
 
date aristocratic part lon regco 
propdir 
m b r 
part 
lon 
N 236 243 236 238 229 234 
R2_adj. 0.446 0.443 0.504 0.415 0.473 0.497 
aic 567.7 593.3 542.8 586.0 529.8 539.3 
Note: t statistics in parentheses ="* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001". Constant included but not reported.  Endogenous 
variables in bold. p values in parenthesis of IV diagnostics. Equations estimated with „ivreg2‟ (Baum et al 2007a, b). 
Variable key: Board share - Share of board of directors capital in issued capital; Director Sq‟d- square of number of directors ; 
Lsize1 – log of paid up capital (£m); Lnoofsh – log of number of shareholders Vol – volatility. Difference between annual high 
and low of ordinary share price divided by  mean of annual high and low. Vol sq‟d) – square of volatility. 
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IV key: „aristocratic‟= number of Lords plus baronets on Board of directors, „date‟= year of IPO or reorganisation, 
„part‟=capital part paid, „propdir‟= proportion of family directors, „regco‟= regulated company; that is statutory or chartered 
versus the rest (mainly „registered‟), „m‟=manufacturing, „b‟=brewing, „r‟=rails, „f‟=finance, „sh‟=board  share, „br‟=UK 
principal area of activity ,  „Lon‟=quoted in London, ‟Lb‟=Lboardvotin, log of board maximum voting control.  
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Table 6 Determinants of the Return on Paid up Capital  
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Estimation OLS  GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV 
     
Lnoofsh 0.203*** 0.876*** -0.178 0.357*** 
 
(3.41) (4.10) (-1.28) (5.25) 
     
Lsize1 -0.497*** -0.852*** -0.434*** -0.729*** 
 
(-6.98) (-6.39) (-4.92) (-9.59) 
     
Vol -0.215 -0.158 0.212 -0.0328 
 
(-0.90) (-0.65) (1.64) (-0.23) 
     
Noofdirectors 0.0190* -0.0185 0.144** 
 
 
(2.27) (-1.23) (3.26) 
 
     
Lboardvotin -0.0790*  -0.104*  -0.263**  -0.433*** 
 
(-2.59) (-2.19) (-2.86) (-3.49) 
     
Board Share  0.792 2.152*  1.117 5.913* 
 
(1.45) (2.14) (1.59) (2.57) 
     Shea R2 
 
0.099 0.059 Lb 0.11 Sh 0.09 
KP  LM under-ident 
 
22.5 (0.00) 9.079 (0.011) 10.99 (0.027) 
H-Jstat 
 
0.344 
(0.557) 
0.402 (0.526) 5.574 (0.134) 
Endog. test 
 
18.11 (0.00) 18.323 (0.00) 1.893 (0.003) 
Excluded instr. 
 
part, regco propdir, part 
propdir, lon, m, 
b ,r  
N 206 206 201 201 
r2_a 0.343 -0.0613 -0.398 0.131 
Aic 375.1 473.9 494.7 398.2 
Note: t statistics in parentheses =* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001.  Endogenous variables in bold. Constant included but not reported. p 
values in parenthesis of IV diagnostics. Equations estimated with „ivreg2‟ (Baum et al 2007a, b).  
Variable key: Board share - Share of board of directors capital in issued capital; Lboardvotin- log of board maximum voting 
control; Lsize1 – log of paid up capital (£m); Lnoofsh – log of number of shareholders Vol – volatility. Difference between 
annual high and low of ordinary share price divided by  mean of annual high and low. 
IV key: „part‟=capital part paid, „propdir‟= proportion of family directors, „regco‟ = regulated company; that is statutory or chartered versus 
the rest (mainly „registered‟) ,„m‟=manufacturing, „b‟=brewing, „r‟=rails,  „sh‟=board  share,   „Lon‟=London, ‟Lb‟=Lboardvotin. 
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46
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47
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53
 See Foreman-Peck and Hannah “Extreme Divorce” for the reasons for the difference (principally d ifferential 
voting powers of some shares). 
54
 The General Method of Moments (GMM) is efficient in the presence of heteroscedasticity. It uses the moment 
conditions that the disturbance terms must be uncorrelated with the exogenous or instrumental variables, with 
equation weights chosen to achieve the lowest variance of the estimator.  
55
 The Calico Printers‟ Association merger was notoriously over-directed on its foundation in 1899, with 84 
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56
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